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Abstract—Today, companies are required to be in control
of their IT assets, and to provide proof of this in the form
of independent IT audit reports. However, many companies
have outsourced various parts of their IT systems to other
companies, which potentially threatens the control they have
of their IT assets. To provide proof of being in control of
outsourced IT systems, the outsourcing client and outsourcing
provider need a written service level agreement (SLA) that can
be audited by an independent party.
SLAs for availability and response time are common practice
in business, but so far there is no practical method for
specifying confidentiality requirements in an SLA. Specifying
confidentiality requirements is hard because in contrast to
availability and response time, confidentiality incidents cannot
be monitored: attackers who breach confidentiality try to do
this unobserved by both client and provider. In addition,
providers usually do not want to reveal their own infrastructure
to the client for monitoring or risk assessment.
Elsewhere, we have presented an architecture-based method
for confidentiality risk assessment in IT outsourcing. In this
paper, we adapt this method to confidentiality requirements
specification, and present a case study to evaluate this new
method.
Keywords-Confidentiality requirements; Outsourcing, Ser-
vice level agreements; Risk assessment
I. INTRODUCTION
Current regulations, such as Basel II [2], SOX [25],
ISO-17799 [13], and BDSG 42a [4], require companies
to be in control of the security (confidentiality, integrity
and availability) of their IT assets and to provide proof
of this in the form of audit reports. In this paper we call
this control requirement and by implication the more de-
tailed IT requirements derived from control requirements are
also control requirements. Satisfying control requirements
is perceived as not contributing to the company’s products
or services, so companies are always aiming at satisfying
control requirements in the most cost-effective way.
Satisfaction of control requirements is further complicated
because organizations outsource tasks that are not part of
their core business, such as IT management, by which some
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of their IT is now actually under the control of other orga-
nizations. In this paper, we introduce and evaluate a method
for identifying and specifying a particularly important con-
trol requirement in outsourcing, namely confidentiality of
information.
IT outsourcing requires connecting IT infrastructures of
two organizations, and mutually giving access to this cross-
organizational infrastructure. For example, some employees
of the provider must be able to perform management services
on the IT infrastructure of the client, and conversely some
employees of the client must be able to grant or revoke
permissions to the employees of the provider. In whatever
way this is done, confidentiality risks arise that must be man-
aged jointly [8]. Assessing the confidentiality risks of either
organization requires knowledge of both organizations’ IT
infrastructure, and also mitigation measures often require
actions in both infrastructures [11], [17]. However, this is
challenging, because outsourcing providers are commonly
large organizations that provide IT services to several clients
and the confidentiality requirements of these clients deviate
from each other. Furthermore, to maintain confidentiality
and protect business secrets, and to satisfy their own control
requirements, providers do not want to reveal more about
their IT infrastructure than strictly necessary.
Providers usually show that they are trustworthy by show-
ing their compliance to regulations, e.g. SOX [25], and
additionally by independent audits, by means of reports
under Statement of Auditing Standards No. 70 Service
Organizations (SAS 70). A client who thinks that these
compliance reports alone are not enough, must additionally
specify the content of the audits in the form of Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) that define service-specific re-
quirements.
An SLA is a mid- to long-term contract that specifies ser-
vice quality levels for the outsourcing provider, and fines for
failing to deliver these. SLAs usually specify quality levels
for availability and response time, but so far in practice they
do not specify quality levels for confidentiality. Yet today,
outsourcing clients have to show that they satisfy the control
requirement of treating their data confidentially, and so they
now need to specify their confidentiality requirements in
SLAs.
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Figure 1. Structure of this research. The top-level problem is shown on the left.
The problem with specifying confidentiality requirements
in an SLA is that clients do not want to specify a quantified
confidentiality level such as that on the average no more
than 1% of the data will be lost per month. Furthermore,
even if they would want to specify a confidentiality level
like this, this attribute could not be monitored because,
typically, confidentiality incidents are not observable by
the client, both because attackers keep their actions secret
and because the provider would not allow any client to
monitor the provider’s IT infrastructure. So another approach
to confidentiality level specification must be chosen, that
satisfies at least three criteria that we have identified so far:
(C1) it does not specify confidentiality levels as percentages
of data loss; (C2) it is not based on monitoring incidents; and
(C3) it does not require a provider to disclose confidential
information.
Companies currently have checklists of information risks
that they use to assess the risks of an outsourcing archi-
tecture. These checklists neither explicitly consider confi-
dentiality, nor provide sufficient insights in confidentiality
risks to support negotiation with the outsourcing provider.
Discussion with several companies taught us that the method
should satisfy several criteria additional to the ones we
mention above:
C4 The method shall be usable with acceptable effort for
the client. In particular, experienced risk assessors shall
be able to use it without following a course and it shall
not increase the time allowed for risk assessment. We
call this criterion ease of use.
C5 The method shall deliver results (confidentiality control
requirements to be included in an SLA) that are inde-
pendent of personal judgment by making less use of
subjective estimates than the checklist based method.
We call this criterion repeatability.
C6 The method shall increase the client’s understanding of
confidentiality risks in this outsourcing relationship.
In this paper we propose and evaluate a method that
meets these requirements sufficiently in the cases that we
investigated. In a way that justifies the claim that it will
meet these criteria in other cases too. The method is based
on specifying confidentiality requirements according to risk
assessment results.
II. RESEARCH METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
In this paper we follow a nested problem-solving approach
as proposed earlier by Wieringa [26] (Fig. 1). At the top level
we have the practical problem of specifying confidentiality
control requirements of an outsourcing client in an SLA.
A practical problem is a difference between the real world
and the way stakeholders would like it to be. To resolve
it, some change must be applied to the real world. In this
paper we call this change a treatment.1 In a rational problem
solving cycle, the treatment is designed after an investigation
of the problem and validated before implementation; and it
is evaluated after implementation.
We have already presented our problem investigation in
Section I. We will describe existing solutions in Section IX.
In Section III we describe our treatment, which is an
extension of the CRAC method [19] for assessing and com-
paring the confidentiality risks of IT architectures, by a step
that specifies requirements for confidentiality risk mitigation
measures. We call this extended method CRAC++.
Sections IV to VII describe a validation of CRAC++. This
is the main topic of this paper.
The question whether a treatment is valid asks whether the
treatment will have the desired effects. This is a research
1Earlier we called it a solution [27] but this hides the fact that a treatment
may not solve the problem completely but only bring the stakeholders closer
to their goals, or may even make the problem worse, as when a doctor
prescribes a wrong medicine.
question. To answer a research question, we have to do
something, and this is a new practical problem at a lower
level of nesting (Fig. 1, middle column). Standard treatment
validation questions are what the effects of a treatment
will be, and whether this will satisfy stakeholders’ criteria
(RQ1), how this compares to alternative treatments (RQ2)
and whether this will work in other problem contexts too
(RQ3). The middle column of Fig. 1 shows a rational prob-
lem solving cycle in which the researcher investigates the
research problem, designs research to answer the research
questions, validates the research design, executes it and
analyzes the results.
To validate a method, we eventually need a realistic
context in which the method is applied. Applying it to a toy
problem is fine for illustration, and testing in an experiment
is good for improving our understanding of the method,
but in order to know whether the method will work in
practice, it has to be used in practice. This could be done
by a field experiment, in which practitioners use the method
to solve an experimental problem [24]. This is extremely
expensive but not impossible. In our case, we opted for the
more realistic option, given our budget, of using the method
ourselves for a real world problem. In other words, we took
an action research approach to validation [3].
We have acquired a case organization that needed to
specify confidentiality requirements in an outsourcing re-
lation (Section IV), and have used CRAC++ to specify
confidentiality requirements that could be included in an out-
sourcing SLA (Section V). This is the right column of Fig. 1.
Returning to the middle column, analysis of this case allows
us to find a first, approximate answer RQ1 (Section VII-A).
Analyzing the mechanisms at work during our application
of CRAC++ allows us also to assess generalizability (RQ3,
(Section VII-C)), and comparison with what would happen
when using other methods allows us to assess trade-offs
with other treatments (RQ2, (Section VII-B)). We discuss
the validity of our action research approach in Section VIII.
III. CRAC++
The Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison
(CRAC) method [19] compares confidentiality risks of two
alternative networked IT architectures by analyzing how in-
formation can flow through a network, and how unauthorized
persons can get access to nodes in the network. Possible
information flow determines the information that can be
present in a node of the network, and therefore allows us
to assess the impact of a confidentiality breach (information
disclosure) at that node Combining this with an analysis
of possible access of an unauthorized person to each node
allows us to assess the risk of confidentiality breach per
node.
In CRAC++, we extend this method with a step to identify
confidentiality requirements of the client that are not implied
by the known confidentiality requirements of the provider,
and which therefore are candidates for inclusion in an SLA
with that provider. Because of the page limitation we could
not include a formal description of the method here, but the
interested reader may refer to the technical report [18].
Step 0: Elicit Input Data
Relevant documents to consider are IT architecture spec-
ifications, existing SLAs, best practices, relevant recom-
mendations, standards and laws that contain confidentiality
control requirements, e.g. the NIST vulnerability list [20].
Relevant stakeholders may include the company’s security
officer, system architect, and security architect.
At the end of this step the risk assessor has the following
data, which is used in the following steps of the method:
Information assets: Functional or organizational data
stored on the system components, and of value to the orga-
nization, such as user credentials, client data and functional
specifications of the system. We classify these information
assets based on their confidentiality-relevant properties, such
as cost to the organization if disclosed. Information assets
are types that have instances. For example, if client data is
an information asset, then each client record is an instance
of this asset.
Threat agents: These are potential attackers, e.g. hack-
ers, or people who may intentionally or accidentally access
information assets that they are not authorized to access,
such as malicious insiders or outsourcing providers. We
classify threat agents based on their estimated capabilities,
such as system knowledge and hacking skills.
IT architectural components: These can be hardware
(servers, terminals, routers, USB-sticks, a physical loca-
tion (e.g. buildings), software (e.g. applications, operating
systems, firewalls), or a network location (e.g. a network
segment).
Relevant vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a condition
of the IT infrastructure or its organization that facilitates
confidentiality attacks on architectural components. For in-
stance if “reuse of storage media without proper erasure” is a
vulnerability a threat agent may exploit this to access infor-
mation. Relevant vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that need
to be mitigated according to the confidentiality requirements
of the outsourcing client .
Confidentiality requirements: We make lists of both the
confidentiality requirements of the outsourcing client and
those of the outsourcing provider.
Step 1: Assessing Total Impact of Disclosure per Component
First, for each information asset and each component that
the asset can reside on, we make an Information Flow
Graph (IFG) that shows how this information can flow
through the network (Fig. 2-(a)). An IFG is a directed
and rooted graph that represents flow of instances of an
information asset from one information source, such as a
database. Each node represents an architectural component.
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Figure 2. (a) Information Flow Graph (IFG) showing how information can
flow through the network; (b) Attack Propagation Graph (APG) showing
how an attacker can move through the network
The combination of IFGs tells us which information can be
present in an architectural component.
The confidentiality expert with the system architect form
the IFGs by analyzing desired or undesired retrieval of
instances of each information asset over physical and logical
connections between components. For instance if the IFG
represents the flow of client data, a client record could flow
from the client database over the network to the terminal PC.
Note that there are components, such as a router, that have
no confidentiality value because no instance can be stored
on them.
Next, for each component, a confidentiality expert to-
gether with the security officer assess the total value of in-
formation on the component. We call this value total impact,
because it indicates the impact of disclosing information on
a component. In the real-world cases that we have done
so far, it is not known by the security officer what the
monetary value of each information asset of the company
is. Security officers prefer to assess the confidentiality value
in terms of ordered non-ratio values such as very high – high
– medium – low – very low. Therefore, in each real-world
case, together with the security officer the confidentiality
expert have defined a qualitative summation operator. This
operator allows us to “add up” the confidentiality value
of the information asset that can be in the component. It
is therefore the estimation, by security officer, of the total
impact of information disclosure per component. Since we
do not have a ratio scale of information value, this “addition”
is not a summation operator but a way of expressing the
opinion of the security officer about the combined value of
all information that can reside on a component.
At the end of this step we identify the components
for which unauthorized access would create a total impact
higher than a certain value (criticality threshold) that is
determined by system owners. We call these components
confidentiality-critical components.
Step 2: Assessing Protection Level per Component
Having assessed the total impact of information loss
per component, we must now assess the likelihood that a
component will be accessed by an unauthorized agent. Fre-
quencies of access by unauthorized agents are not available,
so we cannot assess this likelihood numerically. Instead, a
confidentiality expert will assess, with the security officer
and architect, the protection level of each component for
each class of threat agent and will use this to estimate the
risk of information disclosure per component.
Ease of exploiting vulnerabilities: For this the con-
fidentiality expert together with the security officer and
security architect, assess for each threat agent the ease of
exploiting vulnerabilities, based on the agent’s capabilities.
This assessment only depends on an assessment of the
agent’s capabilities and of vulnerabilities, and does not
require knowledge of the IT architecture. We express ease
of exploiting vulnerabilities in an ordered scale of fractions
between 0 and 1, such as 2/3. The absolute numerical value
of these fractions has no meaning, but their relative ordering
expresses the experts’ opinion about which exploit is usually
more difficult for a threat agent. We assume here that these
opinions can be totally ordered.
Ease of accessing one component: Together with the
security architect the confidentiality expert assess the vul-
nerabilities of each component, and the effectiveness of
any preventive measures taken for these vulnerabilities per
component. This is then combined with the previous analysis
of ease of exploiting vulnerabilities by a threat agent. This
provides us with an assessment of the ease of accessing
a component for each threat agent. Again, the ease is
qualitatively expressed in terms of a totally ordered set of
values.
Protection level of component in network: If there
were only one component in the network we would be
done after assessing the ease of accessing this component.
However, each component is part of the architecture and
an attacker can take many paths through the network. To
analyze the effect of this on each component, we make an
Attack Propagation Graph (APG) for each threat agent. An
APG represents all paths the attacker can take to a valuable
node and is a finite directed graph with one or more terminal
nodes (nodes without outgoing edges). The nodes represent
components of the system and the edges represent attack
steps (Fig. 2-(b)). The edges are annotated with the ease of
this step for the attacker.
We construct an APG by first drawing nodes representing
the entry points of the system and then gradually connecting
further components by considering all possible propagations,
until we reach a component that contains all instances of an
information asset. These are the terminal nodes, because we
assume that the threat agent will be satisfied when he reaches
these nodes, either because this was his goal or because he
is pleasantly surprised by what he finds there.
For each path from an entry node to a terminal node,
we define the bottleneck of the path as the node that is
hardest to access for the threat agent. The bottleneck may
cause the threat agent to stop pursuing this path. For each
terminal node 𝑡, we then select the path with the easiest
bottleneck. The ease of access of this bottleneck is then by
definition the protection level of 𝑡 against this threat agent.
Finally, for all APGs in which 𝑡 is a terminal node, we
define the easiest bottleneck as the protection level of 𝑡.
Components with low protection levels need attention. In
particular, the outsourcing client may want to require the
provider to increase the protection level of this component.
Step 3: Determining Candidate Confidentiality Requirements
Confidentiality requirements of the client that are not im-
plied by known confidentiality requirements of the provider
(and that affect the ease of exploiting vulnerabilities of
confidentiality-critical components) are candidate require-
ments to be included in an SLA. First, we identify vulner-
abilities against which the client wants to defend itself. For
this we identify the client’s confidentiality requirements that
are not implied by known confidentiality requirements of
the provider. We assume that the related vulnerabilities are
not mitigated by measures of the provider and call these
unmitigated vulnerabilities.
In Step 2 we have identified protection levels under the
assumption that the clients confidentiality requirements were
satisfied. Now, we have two scenarios: Either the client asks
the provider to step up its own confidentiality requirements
so that all of the unmitigated vulnerabilities will be mitigated
sufficiently (best case), or we do nothing (worst case). The
best case has been dealt with in Step 2, so now we do the
worst case.
Finally, the confidentiality expert compares the protection
levels of critical components in the best and worst cases and
identifies the confidentiality requirements that the provider
must satisfy. These could be all of the requirements needed
to realize the best case. More realistically, the security officer
has to deal with finite budgets. Each additional requirement
in the SLAs will increase the cost of outsourcing, and
from this point on, confidentiality requirements specification
will be a negotiation between client and provider. CRAC++
has provided the information security officer of the client
with sufficient architectural information to conduct these
negotiations, namely by allowing him to reason about what
would happen if a requirement is included or dropped
from the SLA. CRAC++ is therefore a method to support
decisions about confidentiality requirements.
IV. THE CASE: PROBLEM INVESTIGATION
A. Stakeholders
The case to be described is a large multinational industrial
company, which we refer to as X, with a total of 23,500
employees and divisions in 49 countries (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3. Stakeholders and their inter-relations w.r.t. the action case. Boxes
represent stakeholders, arrows represent business relations, the dashed box
indicates the boundary of X. Gray boxes are the stakeholders whose
confidentiality goals affect the content of the OMA and SLA.
CIT is a competency center of X responsible for provid-
ing information and communication services to the system
units. The confidentiality requirements of these services
are defined in a Corporate Master Agreement (CMA) and
if necessary detailed by Service Agreements (SA). The
CMA contains control objectives that are extracted from
the corporate rules. A control objective is a measure that
indicates fulfillment of a control requirement. For example,
the control requirement
“The organization’s approach to managing information
confidentiality and its implementation shall be reviewed
independently at planned intervals ...”
is operationalized in the SA by the control objective
“CIT shall provide yearly a compliance statement ...
declaring compliancy to corporate regulations on confi-
dentiality of service providing as contracted. ...”
The Managing Board of X is responsible for managing and
protecting the benefits of all competency centers. Compe-
tency center managers yearly report to the Managing Board
on the fulfillment of the requirements in the CMA.
One set of services provided by CIT to users in X
is Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Furthermore, CIT
has outsourced ERP data center hosting services to an
outsourcing provider. An Outsourcing Master Agreement
(OMA) describes the quality attributes of the services that
the outsourcing provider delivers to CIT and an SLA details
the case specific requirements. There is only one rule in
the OMA that describes the confidentiality-related quality
attributes:
“In protecting Confidential Information, [Provider] will
take all necessary precautions and the confidential infor-
mation will be treated in the same manner and with the
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Figure 4. The IT infrastructure that supports the services in the scope of
the case study. The gray rectangles represent physical buildings owned by
the provider or by X.
same degree of care as [Provider] applies with respect to
its own confidential information. [Provider] shall keep
all Confidential Information disclosed to it by X and
[further clients of the Provider] in secure places, under
strict access and use restrictions.”
The current SLA between the outsourcing provider and
client contains no confidentiality requirements.
B. IT architecture
The ERP system and the hardware that it runs on are
owned by CIT but most of it is located in data centers owned
by the provider. The ERP database contains four business
confidential information assets (Fig. 4):
∙ Application information is the business-related infor-
mation of X, e.g. customer records and product prices.
∙ Functional information is monitoring-related informa-
tion, e.g. access logs and IDS rule set.
∙ User information is information on the system users,
e.g. roles and credentials.
∙ Technical information is the IT infrastructure-related
information of the service, e.g. tunnelling data, of the
ERP environment.
In Fig. 4, components with the same functionality that are
located in the same network segment, e.g. employee PC
(CPC), are represented by a single symbol. The firewalls
between network segments provide IP-based access control.
C. Stakeholder Goals
Table I summarizes the stakeholder goals, and obstacles
to goal achievement. (Our use of goals and obstacles is
similar to KAOS [7].) Our aim is to find the confidentiality
requirements that will help X to mitigate the effect of these
obstacles.
As a response to recent changes in governance require-
ments, the Managing Board aims to be compliant with the
Corporate Governance Code (G1). One consequence of this
is that corporate units such as CIT have become responsible
for the quality of the services that they deliver to users in
the company. To audit this, the Managing Board requires
the corporate unit managers to periodically present reports
on the quality of the services that they deliver to the System
Users. However, the outsourcing provider does not allow
CIT to directly analyze the confidentiality properties of the
ERP system. The provider periodically delivers third-party
audit reports based on their own confidentiality requirements
to CIT (O1). This is an obstacle to G1 because these audit
reports do not reflect the confidentiality requirements of X
but of the provider.
CIT aims to deliver the system users ERP services that
are compliant with the corporate requirements of X (G2).
However, the OMA and the SLA that specifies the ERP
Data Center Hosting Service originate from a period before
the new Governance Code, and therefore they do not cover
the confidentiality requirements that follow from this code
(O2).
The provider aims to deliver ERP Data Center Hosting
Services as specified in the OMA and SLA, and to convince
X that his confidentiality baselines satisfy the confidentiality
requirements of X (G3); but also to remain compliant with
SOX [25] and SAS70 [1] (G4).
The provider has difficulty keeping track of the technical
changes related to delivered services and changing confiden-
tiality requirements of its customers (O3). The provider says
that this is because the outsourcing clients are not commu-
nicating their confidentiality requirements clearly (O4).
V. THE CASE: APPLYING CRAC++
Together with company X, we made a plan for applying
CRAC++ and validated the plan with the decision makers
to check whether this would help them reach their goals
(treatment design and validation in the lowest-level cycle
of Fig. 1). After obtaining approval, we executed the plan.
Here, we briefly report on the results.
Step 0: Eliciting Input Data
At the end of this step we obtained the following infor-
mation:
∙ a list of information assets (Application Information,
Functional Information, User Information, and Techni-
cal Information) and their confidentiality values in a
range of low to high;
Table I
CONFIDENTIALITY GOALS AND PROBLEMS.
Stakeholders Goals Obstacles
Managing
board
(G1) To be compliant with Corporate Governance Code. (O1) The provider does not give direct insight into confidentiality
of its systems to X.
CIT (G2) To deliver user units of X CIT services that are compliant
with CIT confidentiality requirements.
(O2) The SLAs and the OMAs do not contain confidentiality
indicators, therefore it cannot be measured how well systems of
the outsourcing provider meet the confidentiality requirements of
the X.
Outsourcing
provider
(G3) To deliver ERP Data Center Hosting Services as specified
in the OMA and SLA and convince X that the confidentiality
level of the services they deliver is enough for the requirements
of X.
(G4) To remain compliant with SOX [25] and SAS70 [1].
(O3) Confidentiality requirements are changing dynamically.
(O4) Outsourcing clients are not communicating their confiden-
tiality requirements clearly
∙ a list of components of the IT infrastructure of the
system (basically, Fig. 4);
∙ a list of confidentiality requirements and control ob-
jectives of the outsourcing client and a list of control
objectives of the outsourcing provider;
∙ a list of known relevant vulnerabilities (Some of these
vulnerabilities are Unprotected Communication Lines,
Possibility To Access The Applications Remotely,
Weak Authentication and Inadequate Patch Manage-
ment Process); and
∙ a classification of possible threat agents (Insider, Mali-
cious Insider, Outsourcer, Subcontractor, and Outsider)
and a classification of their competencies (Physical Ac-
cess, System Knowledge, Technical Knowledge, Social
Knowledge, Social Hacking Skills, Hacking Skills, and
Motivation To Damage).
Step 1: Aggregating Total Impact
We produced four IFGs, one for each information asset,
and the total information disclosure impacts of components
composing them. For instance, the ORACLE Server com-
ponent is in the IFGs modeling the flow of Application
Information (with confidentiality value high), Functional In-
formation (with confidentiality value low), User Information
(with confidentiality value high) and Technical Information
(with confidentiality value low). We determine that the total
impact of the ORACLE Server as very high by aggregating
the confidentiality values of instances of these information
assets that are stored on the ORACLE Server.
All in all, we identify that 27% of the components have
very high total impact, 20% of the components have high
total impact, 7% of the components have low total impact
and the rest of the components have null impact. The CIT
set the criticality threshold as medium. Accordingly we say
that 47% of the components are confidentiality critical.
Step 2: Assessing Protection Levels
We constructed five APGs, one for each threat agent, and
assessed the protection levels of components that comprise
them. For instance the terminal node ORACLE Server is in
the APG for Insider, Malicious Insider, Outsourcer, and Sub-
contractor with the respective protection levels 1/6, 1/2, 4/9
and 1/15. Consequently we define the protection level of the
ORACLE server as 1/2, which indicates the easiest exploit.
Step 3: Determining Candidate Confidentiality Requirements
In our case we did not have access to the list of confiden-
tiality requirements of the provider but we did have access
to his control objectives, which operationalize providers
confidentiality requirements. We therefore first specified
the control objectives of the client that are related with
his confidentiality requirements. Then we checked which
of these were not implied by control objectives of the
provider. There were nine of those. We then assessed the
protection levels for the critical components mentioned in
these objectives in the worst case and found that 20% of
the critical components are affected by at least one of those
nine objectives. Vulnerabilities of these critical components
(unmitigated vulnerabilities) can be mitigated by adding
control objectives that mitigate these vulnerabilities to the
SLA.
For example, the requirement of X “Removal of Property”
is operationalized by the control objective
“All items of equipment containing storage media shall
be checked to ensure that any sensitive data and licensed
software has been removed or securely overwritten prior
to disposal.”
This is not implied by any control objective of the provider
and so “Use of removable media is allowed” is one of
the unmitigated vulnerabilities. It can be exploited by a
threat agent to access the component the ORACLE Server.
According to the worst case scenario we determined that the
protection level of the ORACLE Server is 9/18. In the best
case the protection level of the ORACLE Server is 8/18.
The outsourcing client may now use this information as an
argument to include “Removal of Property” in the SLA.
VI. EVALUATION OF STAKEHOLDER GOAL
ACHIEVEMENT
Evaluation of achievement of stakeholder goals with the
security officer of X and a representative of the outsourcing
provider led to the following conclusions.
G1: By applying CRAC++, the necessary control re-
quirements can be included in the SLAs. Consequently the
audit reports of CIT to Management can improve their
compliance to Corporate Governance Code.
G2: Including in the SLA confidentiality requirements
that are currently not satisfied by the provider allows CIT
to provide services to units of X that comply with CIT
confidentiality requirements.
G3: The provider cannot be held accountable for
requirements not stated in the OMA and SLA, which takes
away O3. Furthermore, since the necessary control require-
ments are a part of the new SLA, the provider is able to
convince X that the confidentiality level of the services he
delivers satisfies the requirements of X, which also takes
away O4.
G4: CRAC++ does not require the provider to disclose
any confidential information to the risk assessor or to X, that
he is not currently sharing. In return for this, the provider
must implement further confidentiality controls as specified
in the new SLA; these do not negatively affect the provider’s
compliance to SOX or SAS70.
VII. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. RQ1: Does CRAC++ satisfy the criteria?
(C1) Confidentiality level specified as percentage of
data disclosure: In Step 1, CRAC++ uses an estimation of
the relative value of disclosure of instances of information
assets to determine the impact and total impact of com-
ponents. Furthermore, in Step 2, we estimate the relative
protection level of terminal nodes to determine the ease
of disclosing instances of information assets. We use these
in Step 3 to determine confidentiality levels, not to define
levels of “acceptable” percentages of information disclosure.
Therefore, CRAC++ satisfies C1.
(C2) Incident monitoring: CRAC++ does not depend
on monitoring incidents but on domain-specific knowledge
of the security officer of the capabilities of threat agents and
the presence of vulnerabilities in components.
(C3) Not disclosing confidential system information: To
identify the vulnerabilities of components and compare pro-
tection levels in best and worst cases, only shared knowledge
about the architecture of the IT infrastructure of outsourcing
provider is used.
(C4) Ease of use: In the field study the first author
needed one week to understand X’s problem (lowest level
problem investigation in Fig. 1) and conduct Step 0 of
CRAC++, and one additional week for developing the spread
sheets and executing the other steps. X has so far no
experience with confidentiality risk assessments, but our
practical experiences show that checklist based security risk
assessments for a system with a similar size take usually one
to two weeks. Also, the security officer of X said that the
steps and results were easily understood and if tool support is
provided then they could be able to use it. This is anecdotal
information and for further evaluation we are planning to
conduct a usability study.
(C5) Repeatability: We compared the repeatability of
CRAC++ with that of the checklist based approach of the
company by counting the number of concepts used in each
that require subjective interpretation. We have excluded the
concept “risk” from the check-list based approach, because
CRAC++ does not aim to present risk, and the concept “un-
mitigated vulnerabilities” from CRAC++, because the check-
list based approach does not aim to elicit requirements. The
result is that 3 out of the 20 CRAC++ concepts are subjective
and 5 out of the 15 checklist concepts are subjective [18]. We
consider this an indication that the method is less subjective
than the check-list based approach.
Earlier [19], we have showen that the CRAC method is
more repeatable than CRAMM [5] and checklist-based risk
assessments. For instance, if the risk assessment would be
conducted with the CRAMM-method, then in total 76% of
the variables would be non-subjective. So we conclude that
CRAC++ is more repeatable than assessing confidentiality
risks with CRAMM and specifying control objectives as we
described in Step 3 of CRAC++.
(C6) Increased understanding: After applying
CRAC++ to the case CIT reported increased understanding
of the effects of confidentiality requirements on the
confidentiality levels of the components and was able to
prioritize them according to the impact of incidents. So
for this particular case, CRAC++ increased understanding.
Whether this is generalizable to other cases is the topic of
RQ3 below.
B. RQ2: How does CRAC++ compare to alternative treat-
ments?
As an alternative treatment to achieving G2, X suggested
to monitor the outsourced IT systems with a Security Inci-
dent and Event Monitoring (SIEM) tool. However, SIEM
tools generate logs with confidential data and possibly
increase the criticality of components, so they increase the
confidentiality risks for X. And they also would require the
provider to disclose confidential information, which violates
C2.
As another alternative treatment to achieve G2, X exe-
cuted a third party audit based on the control objectives
of CIT. However, this treatment did not succeed either.
Although the audit report indicated some noncompliance,
X did not have a mechanism to enforce the provider to
implement measures. Furthermore, the control objectives
of X were not linked to risks. So, X also did not have
an identification of how to mitigate the risk by applying
measures on the part of the system that he has control over.
C. RQ3: In which contexts is CRAC++ usable?
CRAC++ makes a number of assumptions about its con-
text of use. These assumptions govern its reusability in
different contexts. We assume (A1) that the provider does
have confidentiality control objects and that the provider
satisfies these—the CRAC++ method does not contain a step
to check this. Furthermore, CRAC++ does not assume that
the provider discloses confidential information or that the
client has quantified the value of information assets or the
likelihood of unauthorized access per component. By im-
plication, (A2) we do assume that there are security officers
who have informed opinions about this, and the method then
helps in drawing conclusions from these opinions.
Large outsourcing providers are subject to control require-
ments and will satisfy A1. Large outsourcing clients with a
security staff and the chief security officer will satisfy A2.
So far, we have applied CRAC++ twice with similar
results, both in multinational industrial companies where
confidentiality was not a critical requirement until external
regulators enforced it. Operating in highly competitive mar-
kets, these companies are very cost-sensitive and they will
therefore not aim at maximum confidentiality. This might
well be different in privacy-sensitive organizations such as
health care or insurance companies, or in high confidentiality
organizations such as the military. We do point out though
that the qualitative assessments in CRAC++ could be re-
placed by more quantitatively informed techniques without
changing the overall logic of the method. Nevertheless, as
a third assumption for use we hypothesize that (A3) in
the context of use, confidentiality is not the highest-priority
requirement.
All of this supports reusability to any context that satisfies
the three assumptions, with similar answers to the research
questions for those contexts
VIII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
In the previous section we proposed answers to three
questions relevant to the validation of CRAC++. Now we
must consider the validity of these answers themselves:
What is the risk that we answered the questions incorrectly?
The higher this risk, the lower the validity of our answers.
Answering RQ1, we found that CRAC++ satisfies C1, C2,
C3, and C6; analyzing the reasons for these answers we find
no reasoning errors or observational mistakes so we claim
these answers are valid. C4 could not really be checked,
since the user of the method (Morali) is also the inventor of
the method. More systematic usability studies would require
tool support, which currently is absent.
Repeatability (C5) has been checked indirectly by count-
ing the number of subjective concepts. This is not a sure in-
dicator of repeatability, and experimental research is needed
to validate the repeatability of the method.
CIT reported increased understanding (C6), but we did
not apply a formal test (e.g. an exam) to get prove of this,
nor did we analyze to which extent this is due to CRAC++.
The comparison with other approaches (RQ2) does not
introduce new threats to validity that we can think of.
We answered the reusability question (RQ3) by identi-
fying the conditions under which CRAC++ can be used,
and actually showing that it could be used in another case
satisfying these assumptions. Like all inductive conclusions,
our conclusion that CRAC++ can be used in other cases is
uncertain, but because we used analytic reasoning rather than
statistical reasoning, we cannot quantify this uncertainty.
In any case, our generalization claim shall be subjected to
further tests by applying CRAC++ to other cases that satisfy
the assumptions.
IX. RELATED WORK
Several methods have been proposed for managing se-
curity when outsourcing IT management [12], [15], [21],
[23]. Data Protection Agreement (DPA) [22] specifies what
a provider may and may not do with the client’s data.
CRAC++ can be used to identify relevant confidentiality
requirements for a DPA. Insurance Contracts (IC) [8] define
security requirements based on past incidents, which, for
confidentiality, is not realistic. Protection Level Agreement
(PLA) [14] specifies metrics to define protection levels. This
can be used in combination with CRAC++.
Haley et al. [10] define a method for defining security
requirements as constraints on functional requirements. This
differs from CRAC++ because we focus on confidentiality,
which is independent of functional requirements of the
system and serve the control objectives that are imposed by
regulators. We do make explicit trust assumptions as Haley
et al. [9] do, because we assume that the provider can be
trusted to satisfy its own control requirements.
Common Criteria [6] evaluation is a further tool that the
organizations use to present that they are in control of the
security of the products they deliver. However these evalua-
tions consist of merely comparing two sets of requirements
and do not enforce verification nor assure effectiveness
and correct implementation of requirements. Due to its IT-
architecture centered character, CRAC++ provides trace-
ability between the requirements and the security features
of the system components. Thus it assures effectiveness
and correctness of requirements. Furthermore, in case of
changes in the system components, it allows updating the
evaluation results easily. Mellado et al. [16] introduce a
security requirements engineering method that is based on
reusing the results of previous evaluations. However, they
express the accuracy and veracity of requirements in terms
of incident propagations.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper is based on two ideas: (1) Confidentiality
requirements specification cannot be based on incidents, but
must be based on an assessment of the risk of disclosure
of confidential information; (2) Requirements specification
in an outsourcing relation is budget-constrained. Our case
studies and analysis so far indicates that CRAC++ can
satisfy our criteria (C1-C6), but satisfaction of some criteria
such as ease of use and repeatability need further research.
Currently, CRAC++ has been applied using a series of linked
spreadsheets. To allow testing usability and repeatability,
future work will include the development of tool support
for CRAC++.
REFERENCES
[1] American Inst. of Cert. Publ. Accountants.
Auditing Standards Board. Statement on auditing
standards; 70 Auditing Standards (SAS70), 2008.
http://umiss.lib.olemiss.edu:82/record=b1038093.
[2] Basel II: Revised international capital framework, 2005.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm.
[3] R. Baskerville. Distinguishing action research from partici-
pative case studies. J. of Syst. and Info. Techn., 1(1):25–45,
March 1997.
[4] Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: §42a Informationspflicht
bei unrechtmiger Kenntniserlangung von Daten.
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bdsg 1990/ 42a.html.
[5] British Government’s Central Computer and Telecommuni-
cations Agency. CRAMM: Risk Analysis and Management
methodology, 2008.
[6] ISO 15408:2007 Common Criteria for Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-
2007-09-001, CCMB-2007-09-002 and CCMB-2007-09-003,
September 2007.
[7] A. Dardenne, A. van Lamsweerde, and S. Fickas. Goal-
directed requirements acquisition. Sci. Comput. Program.,
20(1-2):3–50, 1993.
[8] S. Gritzalis, A. Yannacopoulos, C. Lambrinoudakis, P. Hat-
zopoulos, and S.K.Katsikas. A probabilistic model for optimal
insurance contracts against security risks and privacy violation
in it outsourcing environments. Int. Journal of Information
Security, 6(4):197–211, 2007.
[9] B. Haley, C. Laney, D. Moffett, and B. Nuseibeh. Using
trust assumptions with security requirements. Requir. Eng.,
11(2):138–151, 2006.
[10] C. Haley, R. Laney, J. Moffett, and B. Nuseibeh. Security
requirements engineering: A framework for representation
and analysis. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., 34(1):133–153, 2008.
[11] C. Huang, R. Behara, and Q. Hu. Managing Risk Propagation
in Extended Enterprise Networks. IT Professional, 10(4):14–
19, 2008.
[12] C. Huang and J. Goo. Rescuing IT Outsourcing: Strategic Use
of Service-Level Agreements. IT Prof., 11(1):50–58, 2009.
[13] ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information Security - Code of
Practice for Information Security Management, 2000.
http://www.iso.org.
[14] Y. Karabulut, F. Kerschbaum, F. Massacci, P. Robinson, and
A. Yautsiukhin. Security and trust in it business outsourcing: a
manifesto. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
179:47 – 58, 2007. Proc. of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Security
and Trust Management (STM 2006).
[15] K. Mayer and N. Argyres. Learning to Contract: Evidence
from the Personal Computer Industry. Organization Science,
15(4):394–410, 2004.
[16] D. Mellado, E. Ferna´ndez-Medina, and M. Piattini. A com-
mon criteria based security requirements engineering process
for the development of secure information systems. Computer
Standards & Interfaces, 29(2):244–253, 2007.
[17] R. Miura-Ko, B. Yolken, J. Mitchell, and N. Bambos. Secu-
rity Decision-Making among Interdependent Organizations.
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE, 0:66–80,
2008.
[18] A. Morali and R. J. Wieringa. Risk-based confidentiality
requirements specification for outsourced it systems (ex-
tended version). Technical Report TR-CTIT-10-09, Centre
for Telematics and Information Technology, University of
Twente, 2010.
[19] A. Morali, E. Zambon, S. Etalle, and R. J. Wieringa. CRAC:
Confidentiality Risk Analysis and IT-Architecture Compari-
son of Business Networks. Technical Report (Submited) TR-
CTIT-09-30, Centre for Telematics and Information Technol-
ogy, University of Twente, 2009.
[20] NIST: National Vulnerability Database, 2008.
http://nvd.nist.gov/.
[21] L. Poppo and T. Zenger. Do formal contracts and relational
governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic
Management J., 23:707–725, 2002.
[22] E. Power and R. Trope. Averting security missteps in
outsourcing. IEEE Security and Privacy, 3(2):70–73, 2005.
[23] R. Sabherwal. The role of trust in outsourced is development
projects. Commun. ACM, 42(2):80–86, 1999.
[24] D. Sjøberg, B. Anda1, E. Arisholm1, T. Dyba˚, M. Jørgensen1,
A. Karahasanovicacute1, and M. Voka´ccaron. Challenges
and recommendations when increasing the realism of con-
trolled software engineering experiments. In R. Conradi and
A. Wang, editors, Empirical Methods and Studies in Software
Engineering, pages 24–38. Springer, 2003. LNCS 2765.
[25] Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2002. http://www.sarbanes-
oxley.com/.
[26] R. Wieringa. Design Science as Nested Problem Solving.
In Proc. of the 4th Int. Conf. on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology, pages 1–12. ACM,
2009.
[27] R. Wieringa, N. Maiden, N. Mead, and C. Rolland. Require-
ments engineering paper classification and evaluation criteria:
A proposal and a discussion. J. Req. Eng., 11(1):102–107,
2006.
